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ALTERNATIVES TO SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS IN KENTUCKY
A spendthrift trust creates a right in property held by one per-
son for the benefit of another, and contains valid provisions against
alienation of the property right either by the voluntary acts of the
beneficiary or by acts of his creditors. The traditional English view
is to disallow spendthrift provisions.' This position is founded on
the belief that to allow a person to enjoy the benefits of property
without subjecting it to the payment of his just debts breeds idle-
ness and promotes fraud. The argument usually given is that alien-
ability is an inherent and inseparable incident of an equitable
estate, as it is of a legal estate; that after a gift of an equitable
estate, a clause forbidding alienation is contradictory and repug-
nant to the interest granted, and so void. However, the English
have modified their strict view materially by the "pay and/or
apply" doctrine, which permits a settlor to provide that trust funds
or income therefrom may be applied for the benefit of the cestui que
trust and so not be subject to the claims of his creditors, and the
"protective trust" doctrine, discussed znfra. America, in keeping with
the Kantian philosophy of giving efficacy to the human will, has
generally upheld the validity of spendthrift trusts. This view has
been rationalized as follows: by the creation of a spendthrift trust,
the trust property passes to the trustee with all the incidents and
attributes of ownership unimpaired, including the power of aliena-
tion; the beneficiary takes the whole legal title to the accrued income
at the moment it is paid over to him; the power of alienation in ad-
vance is not a necessary attribute of such an interest, therefore the
restraint of such alienation does not introduce repugnant or mcon-
sistent elements.
Kentucky, by statute, has taken the English view "Estates of
every kind held or possessed in trust are subject to the debts and
charges of the beneficiaries thereof the same as if the beneficiaries
also owned the similar legal interest in the property."' Since colonial
days, this statute, and its Virginia predecessor, have been construed
to prohibit restraints on involuntary alienation in spendthrift trusts.
Thus a valid spendthrift trust cannot be established in this state.'
There are, however, a number of ways to accomplish some of the
purposes of a spendthrift trust in Kentucky.
RESTRAINTS ON VOLUNTARY ALIENATION2
Trust provisions prohibiting the sale or assignment by the bene-
ficiary of his interest in the trust are not governed by the above-
' Branden v Robinson, 18 Ves. 429 (1811)
'Broadway National Bank v Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882)
'Ky. R. S. sec. 381.180 (1948).
Keith v. First National Bank &-Trust Co., 256 Ky 88, 75 S.W
2d 747 (1934), and cases cited therein.
'Fully discussed in Roberts, Future Property Interests %n Ken-
tucky, 13 Ky. L. J. 186 (1925)
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mentioned Ky. R. S. sec. 381.180. This statute, by its terms, is limited
in application to the loss of the beneficiary's interest through indebt-
edness; witness the fact that the statute has never been invoked in
an attempt to invalidate a provision prohibiting voluntary alienation.
Restraints against voluntary alienation fall into two general categor-
ies, as to form: those containing a provision for forfeiture upon an
attempted alienation, and those containing no such provision.
Restraints on voluntary alienation with no provision for forfei-
ture, but meaning merely that any attempted alienation should fail,
are void.' The basis for this well established rule is the proposition
that a transferee of a beneficiary under a grant containing such re-
straint obtains absolute ownership of the interest transferred, free
from all contingent reversions, during the period of the grant. And
it is wholly incompatible with the idea of absolute ownership to in-
pose such a restriction, the result being that the restriction cannot
be given effect.
A restraint on voluntary alienation with a provision for forfei-
ture (i.e., a provision that the interest of the beneficiary in the trust
should cease and such interest pass to another) in case of an at-
tempted alienation is valid, if such restraint is, in the court's opinion,
reasonable. What restraints are reasonable must be determined by
the particular circumstances of each case; there are no fixed limits
or standards. The following have been held to be reasonable and
valid in Kentucky* restraint for twenty years;' restraint for twenty
years after the testator's death;' restraint until the devisee reached
thirty-five years of age;"0 restraint during the lifetime of the grantor
or of some person other than the grantee;" provision not to sell or
rent the property to persons of African descent for a period of fifty
years." It is important to note that the requirement of reasonableness
may relate to the purpose or object of the restraint as well as to its
duration. The restraint must be reasonable both as to the type of
alienation prohibited and as to the period over which the prohibition
is to extend.
The above cases involved legal estates in property, but they are
nonetheless applicable to the present problem, "Since reasonable re-
straints are allowed in the case of a legal fee simple, it follows that
0 Knefler v. Shreve, 78 Ky 297 (1879) GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON
ALIENATIONS secs. 190a-190h (2d ed. 1895)
Steward v Brady, 3 Bush 623, 66 Ky. 623 (1868)
Price v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co.. 171 Ky 523, 188 S.W
658 (1916).
Johnson v. Dumeyer, 23 Ky L. Rep. 2243, 66 S.W 1025 (1902).
"'Smith v. Isaacs, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1727, 78 S.W 434 (1904)
"Turner v. Lewis, 189 Ky. 837, 226 S.W 367 (1920), Polley v.
Adkins, 145 Ky. 370, 140 S.W 551 (1911), Frazier v. Combs, 140 Ky.
77, 130 S.W 812 (1910)
"Highland Realty Co. v Groves, 130 Ky. 374, 113 S.W 420
(1908).
428 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
they will more readily be allowed in the case of equitable estates."'1
Kentucky goes to greater lengths in upholding restraints on the vol-
untary alienation of legal estates than does any other jurisdiction,
and it is to be expected that the Kentucky courts would go even
further in restraints on equitable estates, because the rule strzcti juris
may be avoided in the case of equitable interests. For instance, a
restraint against the voluntary alienation of a beneficiary's interest
in a trust for the life of the beneficiary was held valid in the case of
Muir's Ex'rs v. Howard."4 Thus, a direct restraint may validly be im-
posed upon the voluntary alienation of the beneficial interest in a
trust provided that (a) such restraint is accompanied by a provision
for forfeiture, and (b) it is a reasonable restraint.
FOREIGN TRUSTS
In order to accomplish for a beneficiary residing in Kentucky
the full and complete protection of a spendthrift trust, a trust with
the usual spendthrift provisions may be established to be admims-
tered in another state, the laws of which state recognize the validity
of spendthrift provisions. Ky. R. S. sec. 381.180 does not invalidate
any trust from its inception, but merely voids spendthrift provisions
when their validity is brought in issue."1 As this statute can be in-
yoked only in relation to the administration of a trust, it can apply
only to trusts which are administered in Kentucky The validity of
any provision imposing a restraint on alienation is a problem of
trust administration; and, like all problems of trust administration,
is governed by the law of the place of administration or "seat" of the
trust.6
Where land is held in trust, the place of administration is the
jurisdiction wherein the land is located; therefore, the law which
governs the administration of a trust of realty is the law of the situs
of the resY Thus in order to provide a spendthrift trust in foreign
land for the benefit of a Kentucky resident, it is necessary for the
trust to attach to land situated in a state that will enforce a spend-
thrift trust.
In determining the place of administration of a trust of per-
sonalty, "The intention of the settlor should prevail if there is a real
connection between the selected jurisdiction and the transaction,"'"
according to a recent Kentucky Court of Appeals decision. In that
case, the settlor's intention, the domicile of the trustee, the location
of the res and the place where the trust business was to be trans-
1 Roberts, supra note 5, at 197.
" 178 Ky. 51, 198 S.W 551 (1917).
" See Note 4 supra.162 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS sec. 297.2 (1935)
-RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS sec. 243 (1934) GOODRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 398 (2d ed. 1938)
"Kitchen v. N. Y. Trust Co., 292 Ky 706, 711, 168 S.W 2d 5, 7
(1943).
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acted (all relating to New York) divested Kentucky of jurisdiction
over the administration of such trust. Although a spendthrift trust
was not involved in that case, it is highly indicative of the position
the Kentucky courts will probably take on this particular issue, since
all problems of trust administration have a common basis and should
be treated similarly A New York case is authority for the validity
of a spendthrift trust admimstered in that state for the benefit of a
resident of a state which disallows spendthrift provisions. This case
indicates that such a spendthrift trust would be upheld by the courts
of New York.
A foreign spendthrift trust is the ideal substitute for a spend-
thrift trust in Kentucky- all of the results of a valid spendthrift trust
are fully effected thereby the only objection being the inconvenience
of distance which is normally experienced when persons in different
states carry on business with one another. Standing alone, this
possibility makes Ky. R. S. sec. 381.180 wholly ineffective as applied
to one who deliberately sets out to avoid the statute.
DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS
"Where the trustee has the discretionary power to withhold from
the beneficiary all payments or beneficial use the interest of the
beneficiary may not be subjected to his debts."'9 Such a discretionary
trust affords the same protection against alienation, both voluntary
and involuntary, as does a valid spendthrift trust. It may provide
even greater protection against involuntary allenation, in view of
the fact that courts hold that certain claims transcend the provisions
of a spendthrift trust.
The theory upholding the inalienability of an interest in a dis-
cretionary trust is that creditors and transferees of a beneficiary ob-
tain only the interest which the beneficiary had in the trust res; if
the beneficiary has no enforceable interest in the trust, those who
claim through him can assert no valid claim to the trust property
This points out the chief difference, legalistically between a spend-
thrift trust and a discretionary trust, viz., a beneficiary of the former
may enforce his interest in the trust, whereas a beneficiary of the
latter may not. This fact may make a discretionary trust undesirable
in many instances, inasmuch as the trustee has absolute power to
withhold all benefits from the cestui que trust, or, at the other
extreme, to deplete the trust fund by disbursing all the benefits
available for distribution. The practical difficulty with a discretion-
ary trust is, of course, the choice of a suitable trustee.
Discretionary trusts are subjected to special consideration in the
Internal Revenue Code. Sec. 167, as applied to a discretionery trust
"0Keeny v Morse, 71 App. Div 104. 75 N.Y. Supp. 728 (1902),
affirming 34 Misc. 114, 69 N.Y.S. 535 (1901)
'"Department of Public Welfare, Commonwealth of Kentucky
v. Meek, 264 Ky 771, 773, 95 S.W 2d 599, 601 (1926)
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in which the beneficiary's interest is inalienable, makes it essential
that-the trustee not be authorized to exercise his discretion in favor
of the settlor, otherwise all income accruing to the trust or given to
any beneficiary becomes taxable as income of the settlor.
PROVISIONS FOR FORFEITURE UPON INVOLUNTARY ALIENATION
In Bull v. Kentucky National Bank,' a testator devised real prop-
erty in trust to pay the rents to his son for life, with a provision that
if a court of last resort should hold that the rents were subject to the
son't debts the trustee should thereupon pay them to the son's wife
for her separate use. A creditor of the son sued to recover such rents.
The court held that the defeasance in the terms of the trust was
valid, and the creditors were entitled to none of the rents which ac-
crued after the rendition of the decree.
The result of a trust with a provision for forfeiture is to defeat
the creditors and transferees of the beneficiary upon the happening
of the event; it affords no protection for the beneficiary, he is wholly
divested of his interest in the trust upon an attempted alienation.
From the beneficiary's point of view, a trust with a provision for
forfeiture is little better than an ordinary trust which is governed
by Ky R. S. sec. 381.180.
To date, there is no decision which would prevent a settlor from
reserving a reversionary interest in such a trust to himself; thus,
upon an attempted alienation by the beneficiary, the settlor would
reacquire the trust property Thereupon the settlor could create the
trust once more; but there can be no duty imposed upon the settlor
to so re-establish the trust.
TRUSTS FOR SUPPORT
"There are yet other cases which hold that an
income given in trust for the cestui's support, cannot be
reached by creditors and thus diverted from the purpose
for which it has been set apart, unless the creditor who
seeks to subject it to his claim can show that the amount
provided is more than adequate for the suitable mamte-
nance of the beneficiary
In a trust for support, it is the nature of the beneficiary's inter-
est which prevents alienation, rather than any restraints imposed.
His interest is limited by the particular purpose set out in the terms
of the trust. He cannot compel payment except for his support. For
this reason, a creditor or transferee cannot compel the trustee to pay
anything, although there is a possibility of recovery from a trust for
support by one who has furnished support to the beneficiary.
21 90 Ky 452, 14 S.W 425, 12 Ky L. Rep. 536, 12 L.R.A. 37 (1890).
=Hackett's Trustee v Hackett, 146 Ky. 408, 412, 142 S.W 673,
675 (1912)
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Earlier vases; however, held that a trust for support would not
effect inalienability unless made discretionary.'
PERSONAL TRUSTS-NON-ATTACHABLE INTERESTS
In the case of Alexander and Co. v. Owens,- land was conveyed
in trust for the sole and separate use of a married woman during her
life, with a provision that she and her children should occupy the
land as a home. It was held that the property could not be charged
for the debts of the beneficiary (although contracted for necessities)
nor could the profits of the land, that might be necessary for her
support, be so subjected.
This decision was based on the proposition that the only interest
which the beneficiary had in the trust property was the right to use
it as a home. This interest was viewed by the court as being personal
to the beneficiary, and of such a nature that no other person could
avail himself of it. The decision appears to be sound, because in no
other way could the purpose of the settlor be achieved, which pur-
pose should be given effect, since it directly contravened no rule of
law and was socially desirable.
The scope of personal trusts is necessarily narrow- there are very
few interests which the court would declare inalienable because of
their personal nature. Although such trusts are thus limited in ap-
plication by their subject matter, they are, however, not negligible.
Often the type of interest involved in a spendthrift trust will be per-
sonal and non-attachable.
BLENDED TRUSTS-INSEPARABLE INTERESTS
Where a trust is created for two or more beneficiaries, and the
interest of one beneficiary is inseparable from that of the others,
none of them can voluntarily alienate his interest nor can creditors
reach it.' In such blended trusts no definite portion of the entire
beneficial interest can be attributed to any one beneficiary there-
fore his interest cannot be alienated since it is indefinite and unas-
certainable. Where the beneficial interest of one is capable of being
separated from the interests of others it is alienable.'
A blended trust usually is effected by establishing a trust for
the benefit of certain named persons without designating the pro-
portionate share of each one. In Hackett's Trustee v. Hackett' how-
ever, a grant in trust was executed for the benefit of the settlor's
nephew, "his wife and infant children residing with him equally-"-
'Ratliff's Ex'rs. v Com., 139 Ky. 533, 101 S.W 978 (1907) Hop-
per v Eastern Ky Asylum, 27 Ky L. Rep. 649, 85 S.W 1187 (1905)
",4 Ky L. Rep. 621, 11 Ky. Opin. 898 (1883)
2'Russell v. Meyers, Trustee, 202 Ky 593, 260 S.W 377 (1924)
"Rudd v Hagan, 86 Ky. 159, 5 S.W 416 (1887)
146 Ky. 408, 142 S.W 673 (1912).
' Id. at 409, 142 S.W at 673.
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the court held the interest of the nephew to be inseparable and not
liable for his debts. This case has been criticised in view of the word
"equally" in the limitation.?
This type of conveyance is often combined with a personal trust,
for the reason that in a blended trust standing alone the court may
hold the interests of the beneficiaries to be divisible into equal
shares and therefore alienable. When this combination is made, it is
often difficult to ascertain the true basis for a decision holding the
interest inalienable. This holding is invariably made when an In-
separable interest is combined with a non-attachable interest, and
both factors are mentioned by the court.'
OTHER ALTERNATIVES
The following are suggested as additional devices which achieve
some of the results of a spendthrift trust. There is no authority in
Kentucky for their use, but neither have they been expressly dis-
allowed by decision or statute.
Solvency as a Condition Precedent-A trust may be established
with an express provision that the beneficiary is not to receive his
interest in the trust until he becomes financially solvent. The ob-
jection to this provision is that the beneficiary's trustee in bank-
ruptcy should be able to reach the interest of the beneficiary in the
trust. However, such provisions have been upheld in a majority of
the jurisdictions where their validity has been tested. The United
States Supreme Court has held that the Federal Bankruptcy Act
presents no obstacle to such trusts."
Protective Trusts have been adopted in England by statute,"
and are recommended by Bogert for use in Kentucky.' A protective
trust is, essentially an ordinary trust with a provision that upon an
attempted alienation of the beneficiary's interest, voluntary or in-
voluntary, the ordinary trust shall terminate and a discretionary
trust for the support of the beneficiary or of the beneficiary and
his heirs shall b created.
Insurance Trusts-The statutes of a number of states provide
that the proceeds of an insurance policy may be left with the insur-
ance company to pay installments to the beneficiary, and that such
payments may be made inalienable.' By the principles outlined
' GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS sec. 186, n. 16 (1936)
Stephens v Bishop, 3 Ky Opin. 351 (1869).
"Hull v Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 245 U.S. 313, 38 Sup. Ct.
103, 62 L.Ed. 312 (1917)
"2 Trustee Act, 1925, 15 Geo. V c. 19, sec. 33.
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES sec. 226 (1935)
IND. STAT. sec. 39-704 (Burns 1933) MIss. ANN. CODE sec. 5682
(1942) 6 Mo. STAT. ANN. secs. 5752, 5772, 6011 (1934), OHIO GEN.
CODE sec. 9398-1 (1934) TENN. CODE ANN. sec. 6398 (Williams 1934),
fraternal benefit insurance only.
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above dealing with foreign trusts, these statutes of other states may
be invoked to provide spendthrift trust protection for a Kentucky
resident.
CONCLUSION
Despite the wording of Ky R. S. sec. 381.180, it is not true that
estates of every kind held or possessed m trust are subject to the
debts of the beneficiaries thereof, because a valid spendthrift trust
may be administered in another state for the benefit of a Kentucky
resident, and such trust is governed wholly by the foreign laws.
Thus an accepted principle of the conflict of laws precludes Ken-
tucky from cutting off its citizens from the protection of spendthrift
trusts, so long as it is surrounded by states having a different social
policy.
The result of the Kentucky decisions is to make the statute only
partially effective even when applied to trusts administered within
the state. Ky R. S. sec. 381.180 cannot be given the latitude required
by its terms without doing violence to principles which have long
been well established in our law. For example, to hold "every trust"
liable for the debts of the beneficiary violates the rule that in order
to subject the property of a debtor to the claims of his creditors, the
debtor must have an interest in the property which he can enforce.
The Kentucky cases show some disinclination to follow the
statutory policy against spendthrift trusts. This position may be
justified in view of the fact that the legislature has not clarified its
policy Whatever may have been the serious objections to spend-
thrift trusts in early times, it is apparent that they do not exist now.
On the contrary, a policy is currently gaining favor which not
only upholds spendthrift trusts, but makes them a favorite of the
law. To a great extent spendthrift trusts serve a purpose similar to
that of charitable trusts: both perform services which might other-
wise fall upon the state. A spendthrift trust may provide for a per-
son who might otherwise become indigent and a charge of the state
in the absence of such provision. There is, therefore, good reason
for not only enforcing spendthrift trusts but also extending to them
the favored treatment afforded charitable trusts. The experience of
states which enforce spendthrift provisions is that the desirable re-
sults achieved far out-weigh the undesirable ones which are possible
if the spendthrift trust device is abused.:
The Kentucky rule should be changed, both because it is inef-
fective, and because even if given effect, it reaches an undesirable
result. This change should be made by the legislature and not by
the courts. The statutes of other states furnish examples of desirable
substitutes for the Kentucky rule. These statutes, in general, provide
for either (a) limited recognition of spendthrift trusts, i.e., enforcing
' Costigan, Spendthrift Trusts Reexamined, 22 CALIF. L.REV. 471
(1934).
.... KtN-UbK ' LA-v' JOURNAL
spendthrift provisions as to payments not exceeding a specified
amount, or (b) full recognition of spridthrift trusts with certain
claims excepted, such as claims against the beneficiary for support
of dependents or for alimony
APPENDIX
In furtherance of the views expressed in this note and as a
preliminary step in putting them into effect, the following is a pro-
posed statute for the authorization and regulation of spendthrift
trusts in Kentucky This proposed statute is designed to enforce the
desirable elements of spendthrift trusts while eliminating most of
their evils by proper regulation.
Subject to the provisions of the following
sections of this act, a trust instrument may provide
specifically that the interest of any beneficiary in the
income of the trust shall not be subject to voluntary or
involuntary alienation by the beneficiary. A trust in
which the interest of the beneficiary is subject to re-
straints on alienation, as provided in this act, may be
called a "spendthrift trust."
Notwithstanding a specific provision in the
terms of a trust restraining the alienation of the interest
of the beneficiary, a transferee or creditor of the bene-
ficiary shall be entitled to reach the interest of the bene-
ficiary in satisfaction of is claim to the following ex-
tent:
(1) All income due or to accrue in the fu-
ture to the beneficiary in excess of $3600 per annum
shall be subject to attachment by a creditor of the bene-
ficiary and shall be freely alienable by the beneficiary
(2) All income due or to accrue in the future
to the beneficiary in excess of $1800 per annum shall be
subject to the following claims:
(a) claims by dependents of the beneficiary for support;
(b) claims for alimony against the beneficiary;
(c) claims for debts incurred by the beneficiary through
his fraudulent misrepresentations to creditors that
his interest in the trust was alienable;
(d) tort claims for which the beneficiary is liable;
(e) claims for necessaries furnished the beneficiary-
(f) claims for state and federal taxes;
(g) any judgment based upon the above claims.
Where the beneficiary of any spendthrift trust
is also the beneficiary under any other spendthrift or
similar trust created or administered either within or
without this state, the aggregate income payable under
all such trusts to the beneficiary shall be considered to-
gether for the purpose of determining the rights of
creditors and transferees under this act.
Where the interest of the beneficiary attaches
to any trust which has previously been held to effect
inalienability of such interest, any sums which are
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actually paid to or for the beneficiary from such trusts
shall be considered for the purpose of determining the
rights of creditors and transferees under this act.
The right of any beneficiary of a trust to re-
ceive the principal of the trust or any part of it, pres-
ently or in the future, shall be freely alienable and sub-
ject to the claims of his creditors, notwithstanding any
provision to the contrary in the terms of the trust.
It is not essential to the validity of a provision
restraining voluntary alienation that it be accompanied
by a provision restraining involuntary alienation; also,
a provision restraining involuntary alienation may be
enforced although the terms of the trust contain no pro-
vision restraining voluntary alienation. The presence of
one such provision expressly shall not be construed as
implying the presence of the other.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as au-
thorizing a person to create a spendthrift trust for his
own benefit. Nor may a valid spendthrift trust be cre-
ated for the benefit of a person who pays a substantial
consideration in exchange for the creation of the trust.
The interest of any beneficiary who is also the settlor or
who has paid substantial consideration for the creation
of the trust shall be freely alienable and subject to the
claims of his creditors.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as ef-
fecting the exemptions from debt now or hereafter ac-
corded by law to any kind of property or interest in
property- and such property or interest in property m
trust shall be exempt from debt to the same extent as if
free from trust.
CALVERT C. LITTLE
